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This paper uses data from 3144 rare book auctions to study the breadth of auctioneers' estimate 
ranges. The 'information hypothesis' proposes that wider ranges reflect greater uncertainty. The 
'reserve  hypothesis'  proposes  that  a  narrower  range  indicates  a  higher  reserve  price.  The 
information hypothesis is tested by seeing whether estimate breadths are related to the presence 
of  greater information about likely prices. The reserve hypothesis is tested by seeing whether 
narrower  estimate ranges predict  'no sales'. Evidence is found in support of  the information 
hypothesis but not the reserve hypothesis. The paper identifies differences between the auction 
houses Christie's and Sotheby's in the estimate strategies they adopt. 1.1  INTRODUCTION 
In many settings, auction firms engage experts to prepare estimates of prices. The estimates are 
published before sale events and often comprise an estimate range with  an upper and a lower 
bound. This paper investigates the breadth of such estimate ranges. Two main hypotheses have 
been proposed with respect to the breadth of the ranges. The 'information hypothesis' proposes 
that the breadth reflects auctioneers'  uncertainty. The 'reserve  hypothesis'  stresses interaction 
between  the  auctioneer and  the  seller, and the  role of  the  seller's  reserve. The information 
hypothesis is untested, while there is empirical  evidence in favour of  the reserve  hypothesis 
from auctions of Latin American art in New York. 
The paper uses data from 3144 rare book auctions at twenty-one Christie's and Sotheby's sale 
events between  1984 and 1999 in Australia. Data from book auctions can be used to analyse 
estimate breadths, and are especially useful for testing the information hypothesis. As well as 
high and low price estimates, the book auction data contain several measures of the amount of 
information available to auctioneers that has a bearing on price expectations. Key among these 
measures are sales of identical and nearly identical copies at other auctions nearby in time, and 
the presence of multiple copies of particular books at particular auction events. Other measures 
of  the information  available to auctioneers can also be extracted from the book auction data. 
The information  hypothesis is tested by  seeing whether  estimate breadths  are related to the 
presence of greater information about likely prices, 
The  book  auction  data  can  also  be  used  to  test  the  reserve  hypothesis  because  there  is 
information  about  'passed-in'  items  (also  called  'no-sales'):  books  that  failed to  reach  the 
seller's reserve price and so were not sold. The reserve hypothesis is tested by seeing whether 
narrower  estimate ranges predict passed-in items, and therefore  whether they  are associated 
with a higher reserve. The paper contributes to the empirical literature on  auctions by  testing the information  and 
reserve hypotheses in tandem and in a new  setting. The approach used to test the infonnation 
hypothesis is novel, The analysis of  pre-sale estimates is informative about the  strategies of 
auctioneers. It is also relevant to learning in markets and how institutional features influence the 
determination of prices. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 provides some background information about 
estimate ranges  and  reviews  the  previous  literature. Section  1.3 describes the  dataset  and 
relevant features of  the institutional setting of  Australian book  auctions. Section 1.4 gives a 
profile  of  the  data.  Section  1.5  investigates  the  information  hypothesis,  and  Section  1.6 
investigates the reserve hypothesis. Section 1.7 presents some concluding comments. 
1.2  BACKGROUND  AND LITERATURE SURVEY 
Pre-sale estimates are  a feature of  auctions of  real  estate, art, jewellery,  antiques, business 
equipment  and  many  other  assets.  Numerous  researchers  have  investigated  whether  the 
estimates are biased. See for example Ashenfelter (1989), Louargand and McDaniel (1991), and 
Chanel et al. (1996). However, other aspects of  estimates are not much explored. One of  these 
aspects is the  breadth of  estimate ranges. Estimates are often published as  a high  and  low 
estimate rather than a point estimate. Two main hypotheses have been proposed to explain the 
breadth of  estimate ranges: the infonnation hypothesis and the reserve hypothesis, 
The  information  hypothesis  proposes  that  estimate  range  breadth  reflects  auctioneers' 
uncertainty,  with  a  narrower  range  indicating  greater  confidence  in  the  estimate.  If  this 
hypothesis  were  true,  estimate  ranges  would  be  narrower  when  auctioneers  had  more 
information about likely prices. This information might include previous prices, appraisals by other experts and information  about the quantity and quality of  the assets in circulation. The 
information hypothesis claims strong intuitive support but has not been tested directly. Beggs 
and Graddy (1997) regressed the ratio of the price to the estimate range midpoint on the breadth 
of  the  estimate range  and  variables  that  captured  asset  characteristics  and  sale order.  The 
coefficient  on  breadth  was  negative  and  significant. Beggs  and  Graddy  interpreted  this  as 
tentative evidence that the estimate range spread was wider for those items where the estimate 
was less accurate. The main shortcoming of this approach is that it does not explicitly capture 
the information available to auctioneers.' 
The reserve hypothesis stresses interaction between the auctioneer and the seller. Ekelund et al. 
(1998)  studied  estimate ranges in  6378 New  York  auctions of  paintings  by  Latin-American 
artists. Ekelund et al. claimed that in these auctions, the lower bound of the estimate range was 
the result of a negotiation in which the seller had the final say about the reserve and therefore 
the lower bound. This is because the auction houses applied a (loose) rule that the reserve was 
80 per cent of the low estimate. Ekelund et al. claimed this  'rule'  did not always hold, in that 
the reserve could be less than 80 per cent of  the lower bound or non-existent. It was, however, a 
binding rule in the auctions they studied that the low estimate was not below the reserve price.3 
The expert alone chose the upper bound in the estimate range. This separation of responsibility 
meant that ranges were narrower when  the seller set a  'high'  reserve.  This can be tested by 
seeing whether narrower ranges are more likely to be associated with passed-in items, Passed-in 
items are those that fail to reach the reserve price. A 'high'  reserve price is more likely to see an 
item passed-in. 
Another problem with the approach of Beggs and Graddy (1997) was their definition of estimate range breadth as 
the difference between the high and low estimates, not the proportional difference. The present paper returns to 
this issue in Section 1.5. 
This second rule is followed elsewhere. In art sales, Christie's London announces that the reserve  shall not 
exceed the low estimate. 
5 To test whether the estimate range was related to items being passed-in, Ekelund et al. defined 
the  breadth of  the range  as  (high - 1ow)Jmid point  and used  a binomial  Probit  model  (1 = 
passed-in, 0 = sale) with variables that captured the separate effects of  auction house (Christie's 
and Sotheby's), whether the painting was signed, the size of the work (measured by the area in 
square inches), the year of  the sale and the breadth of  the  estimate range. In  support of the 
negotiation hypothesis, they found that the breadth  of  the estimate range was negatively  and  . 
significantly related to the likelihood of  an item being passed-in. 
4 
It is not clear whether this result is specific to art auctions in New  York or whether  it is a 
general feature of  art auctions as well as auctions in other settings. It might be that elsewhere 
there is no relationship between estimate range breadth and passed-in items, or even a positive 
relationship,  as  sellers  and  auctioneers who  are especially uncertain  about  an  asset's  value 
might set a wide estimate bound and post a high reserve to exploit the uncertainty or protect 
against  the  risk  of  selling  too  low.  Evidence  is  needed  from  another  setting.  Also,  the 
information and negotiation hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, so there is a need to test 
these hypotheses together in the same setting. To do so, data are needed on prices realised as 
well  as passed-in  items. Ideally,  the  assets sold  would be  fairly  homogenous.  Researchers 
would need to know what information the auctioneers had at the time of sale. 
1.3  DATA AM) MARKET SETTING 
Data were collected from 3144 rare book auctions held at twenty-one sale events at Christie's 
Australia and Sotheby's Australia. Book auctions have a number of  advantages for studying 
estimate ranges. Book auctions feature a spread of  asset values and a simple sale environment 
that is similar to those in many other settings. All the book auctions studied were ascending 
auctions that featured secret reserves. In all the auctions, the books were available for pre-sale 
6 inspection  and pre-sale  catalogues were issued. The catalogues provided  descriptions of  the 
books, including accurate bibliographic information and information about the books' physical 
condition. 
An  advantage of  studying a set of auctions in  Australia is that they provide  evidence from 
outside the standard targets of New York and London art auctions. It is useful to know whether 
results found in those centres apply elsewhere. 
There  were  several  reasons  for  focusing  on  auctions  at  Christie's  and  Sotheby's.  Their 
catalogues  are widely  distributed  and  include pre-sale  estimates.  In  the  1980s and  1990s, 
Christie's was one of  the main auction houses dealing in  books in Australia. Sotheby's had a 
smaller share of the market but in many other respects was similar to Christie's. Like Christie's, 
it is a subsidiary of a multi-national firm.4 It services the same 'high end'  segment of the book 
auction  circuit.  Auctions  at  Christie's  and  Sotheby's  are very  similar in  the  way they  are 
c~nducted.~ 
All the data are publicly available. The auction catalogues were sourced from the University of 
Melbourne Library. The price data were drawn from Australian Book  Auction Records  (see 
Kells,  2002, for a description).  The  present  author matched the  books  in  Australian  Book 
Auction Records with the books in the catalogues and entered the prices and estimates into a 
database. 
The price data in Australian Book Auction Records exclude books that are not 'of Australasian 
intere~t'.~  Excluding such books from the analysis had the effect of m&ng  the cohort of books 
4 The same cannot be said of any other book auction firms operating in Australia over the sample period. 
There is a growing body of empirical work comparing auction outcomes at sales held by these two firms. 
This is defined as books  and periodicals written  by  Australians, or published in  Australia.  or  written about 
Australia or Australians, or about Antarctica, New Guinea, New Zealand or the South Pacific more homogenous. Multi-book lots were also excluded.'  This is also not without implications. 
Auction houses  decide  whether to sell books individually or in multiple  book  lots.  Selling 
books in multiple book lots might exclude amateur or retail buyers, who face higher transaction 
costs in offloadmg the unwanted books, and financial constraints in purchasing the multiples in 
the first place.8 For some very high value books, an estimate range was not published but was 
available on application at the auction house.g These 'on application' estimates were excluded. 
The twenty-one sale events were all significant Australiana sales and were all held between 
1984 and 1999, The smallest of the twenty-one sale events had 22 auctions of  single-book lots 
of Australasian interest. The largest had 423 such auctions. Every one of  the sale events was 
held in Sydney or Melbourne. Sales before 1984 are not included because many of  those sales 
&d not  have  estimates,  and the price  data are less readily  available before  1984."  All  the 
auctions pre-date the goods and services tax that was introduced in Australia on 1 July 2000 
and  that  applies  to  books  sold  at  auction.  Sotheby's  largely  withdrew  from  auctioning 
Australiana between 199  1 and 1999. 
1.4  DATA PROFILE 
This Section  gives  a  graphical  and  statistical  profile  of  the  boak  auction  data.  Following 
Ekelund et  al. (1998), the breadth of  the estimate ranges is calculated as (high estimate -  low 
7  Book  auctions typically include a combination of  single book and multiple book lots. One sale event in the 
sample, at Christie's in 1994, saw an entire library of books sold as one lot. 
8  Amateur  buyers  (private  individuals, novices)  as  opposed  to  professional  buyers  (eg.  people  buying  for 
institutions); retail buyers as opposed to wholesale buyers (eg. booksellers, dealers), 
9 An  example was lot 152 (ABAR reference 901486) at Sotheby's, April 1990, which sold for $1 10,000 (nominal, 
including buyer's premium). 
lo The price data before 1984 are incomplete because Austraiian Book Auction Records was not published between 
1979 and  1982 inclusive and  the  1983 volume covered only a small number of  sale events as the data were estimate)/midpoint, where the midpoint is the simple average of the high  and low estimates. 
Figure 1.1 shows that the breadths tend to cluster at particular points, for example 40 per cent 
and 50 per cent. The ten most common breadths are 0.400 (783 instances), 0.286 (451), 0.222 
(345), 0.500 (270), 0.182 (245), 0.667 (194), 0.333 (7), 0.250 (loti), 0.200 (77) and 0.154 (76). 
A  wide  variety  of  actual estimate ranges  are represented by  each  one  of  these  frequently 
occurring breadths. 
Figure 1.1 :  Distribution of breadths, whole sample 
The mean breadth over the whole sample is 33.2 per cent. Figure 1.2 shows that there is a weak 
negative relationship between estimate range breadth and book value, captured by the midpoint 
of  the estimate range (the gradient of  the trendline is -1.1346;  the R-squared is 0.071). The 
average breadth for 'high  value' books (defined as books with a midpoint estimate above the 
median midpoint estimate) is 29.4 per cent (1565 observations), compared with 36.8 per cent 
for low value books (1579 observations). Figure 1.3 gives the distributions of breadths for low 
value and high value books separately. Narrower breadths are more common for the hish value 
books. Also, the estimates for low value books are relatively concentrated at one point (40 per 
cent). 
compiled retrospectively in 1985 and 1986. 
9 Figure 1.2: Relationship between book value and range breadth, whole sample 
Figure 1.3: Distribution of breadths of high value books and low value books 
That estimate ranges are narrower for more valuable books makes sense with respect to the 
information hypothesis, as for those items the auction houses are likely to apply more appraisal 
effort. The more auction houses seek out information about values, the narrower the estimate 
ranges would be. Beggs and Graddy (1997) found evidence of  a positive relationship between 
value and breadth, but this finding was influenced by their choice of  definition of  the spread: 
the difference between the high  and low estimates, not the proportional difference used by 
Ekelund et al. (1998) and in this paper. The existence of  a statistically significant relationship 
between estimate range breadth and value in the book auction data is investigated formally in 
the next Section. 
There are differences across the two auction houses in the sample, The average estimate breadth 
for Christie's is 36.2 per cent, compared with 29.4 per cent for Sotheby's. Figure 4 shows the 
distribution  of the breadths for the two auction firms. The breadths for Sotheby's tend to be smaller, and they are more evenly spread across different percentages. Thus, in two senses, the 
Sotheby's  estimates are  more precise  than  the  Christie's  estimates:  the  Sotheby's  estimate 
ranges are narrower, and they are less concentrated at standard points. 
Figure 1.4: Distribution of breadths for Christie's and for Sotheby's 
There are other differences between Christie's and Sotheby's. In the sample, Christie's had 384 
items passed-in, out  of  1759 offered  for  sale, giving  a pass-in  rate  of  21.8  per  cent. For 
Sotheby's, the pass-in rate was 26.4 per cent (1385 offered, 366 passed-in). 
Overall, the pass-in rate was  23.9 per cent  (so the  'clearance  rate'  was  76.1 per cent). The 
average estimate range breadth for passed-in items (34.3 per cent; 750 observations) was higher 
than  the average breadth  for items that  sold (32.9 per  cent; 2394 observation;).  This is not 
consistent with the reserve hypothesis. The relationship between estimate range breadths and 
passed-in items is explored formally in Section 1.6. 
1.5  INF'ORMATION AND THE BREADTH OF ESTIMATE RANGES 
This  Section  explores whether  the  breadth  of  expert  estimate  ranges  are  narrower  when 
auctioneers have more information about likely prices. The analysis begins with a statistical and 
graphical analysis. Then the results of a regression analysis are presented. 
There are a number of  ways to measure how much information auctioneers' have about likely 
11 sale prices. There will be more information for books that are traded more often. This can be 
measured by counting the number of  times copies are auctioned within a year, say, across all 
auction firms. Another indicator of  frequency of  sale is the number of  copies of  a particular 
book that are offered as separate lots at the same sale event. Books are published in runs, and it 
is often  the  case that more than  one copy is offered for sale at  the  same sale event. Such 
sequential sales of identical and nearly identical assets have been the subject of  a great deal of 
C 
empirical work on how  prices  and auctioneers  behave in multiple object  auctions."  (Kells, 
2001, investigated price paths in sequential  auctions of  rare books  in Australia.)  As well  as 
indcating that a book is frequently traded, the presence of more than one copy in a particular 
sale may lead the auctioneer to apply greater appraisal effort in arriving at the price estimate. 
Defects in assets are another indicator of information about likely sale prices. It is reasonable to 
think that the value of an object is less certain when it is damaged. A defect will affect different 
people's  valuations in different ways, and many different types of major and minor defects can 
occur. 
In forming their valuations, buyers and sellers draw on information in price guides and, in the 
book market, bibliographies. The information in theses sources includes the number of  copies 
that were printed (rarity is key when valuing books) and other details that affect values, such as 
'points'  that  indicate  priority  in  publication.  The  most  well  known  and  authoritative 
bibliography  of  rare  Australian  books  is  J.  A.  Ferguson's  Bibliography  of  Austmlia 
('Ferguson').  It covers books published between  1784 and 1900 inclusive (not all the books of 
Australasian  interest published  in this  period  are included).  It was  first published  in  seven 
volumes between  1941 and  1963. A facsimile edition, also in seven volumes, was published 
between 1975 and 1977. An addenda covering 1784 to 1850 was published in 1986. 
11 For example, see Ashenfelter (1989), Chanel et al. (19@),  Jones, et al. (1996). All the information in these four measures was publicly available at the time of  sale. This is 
important. Not  only was the information available for auctioneers to use in arriving at their 
estimates, but it was also available for buyers to form judgements  about the accuracy of  the 
estimates and therefore the credibility of the experts. Auction houses care about their credibility 
because they compete to attract sellers and buyers. 
Distributions of  breadths were prepared for each of the four information measures. Figure 1.5 
gives the distribution of breadths for books that were frequently traded, proxied by whether at 
least one other copy was sold at auction in Australia in the same calendar year. Figure 1.5 also 
gives the distribution of breadths for books that were not frequently traded. Figure 1.6 gives the 
analogous two distributions for books in and not in the Bibliography ofAustralia. Figures 1.5 
and  1.6 give tentative  support to  the hypothesis that  frequently  traded  books  and  books  in 
Fergusok-that  is, books for which more information is available-have narrower estimate 
bounds. (The average breadth for frequently traded books is 32.0 per cent, compared with 34.3 
per  cent  for the other books. The average breadth for books  in  Ferguson  is  31.8 per  cent, 
compared with 34.2 per cent for those not in Ferguson.) Figure 1.5: Distributions of breadths for frequently traded books and infrequently traded 
books 
Figure 1.6: Distribution of breadths for books in and not in Ferguson 
r-l 
For the other information measures-whether  a book has a defect, and whether a book was sold 
as  part  of  a sequence of  identical or  nearly  identical  titles---the  distributions  are  not  very 
revealing, and  are not  shown. The distributions for books  with  and  without defects closely 
resemble each other. The same is true for the distributions of  books in and not in sequences, 
thoush the sample of books in sequences is small (467 observations) and so is not very suitable 
to this kind of graphical analysis. (The average breadth for books with defects is 33.3 per cent, 
compared with  33.1 per  cent for books  without  defects. The  average breadth  for books  in 
sequences is 31.7 per cent, compared with 33.5 per cent for books not sold in sequences.) 
To explore more formally the relationship between estimate breadths and the four information 
measures, the following model was estimated using ordinay least squares regression: 
BREADTH  =  f(CONSTANT,  MIDPOINT,  mTIPLE,  SEQUENCE,  FFiRGUSON, 
DEFECT, CHRISTIE'S, PASSED-IN)  (Equation 1) BREADTH is defined as 1000*(high estimate -  low estimate)/midpoint. 
As  in the graphical and statistical analysis, four separate measures of  information were used. 
Trading frequency was captured by  the dummy variable MULTIPLE which takes a value of 
one if  at  least one other copy  of  the  book  was  sold  (not passed-in)  at  another auction in 
Australia in  the  same calendar  year,  as  documented  in  Australian  Book  Auction  Records. 
Otherwise, MULTIPLE is zero. The dummy variable SEQUENCE is one when  at  least one 
additional copy of  the book was offered at  the same sale event, and zero otherwise. For the 
dummy variable SEQUENCE, the other copies offered in the sequence were not  necessarily 
sold: they might have passed-in. The dummy variable FERGUSON is one if  the book is in the 
Bibliography ofAustralia and zero otherwise. The dummy variable DEFECT is one if the book 
had a defect that was documented in the auction catalogue, and zero otherwise. 
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 in the previous Section showed that the breadths of  estimate ranges differ 
across asset values. The variable MIDPOINT was used to capture the likely sale value and is 
the simple average of  the high and low estimates (in 1999  dollar^).'^ In the previous Section, it 
was also shown that Christie's and Sotheby's differ somewhat in the profile of  their estimate 
breadths. A quick look at the data also shows that the two auction firms differ across the four 
information measures, as shown in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1: Data shares across auction firms for each information measure 
l2 The advantage of  using the midpoint instead of the price is that midpoint data are available for passed-in items 
whereas price data are not. The midpoint was  converted into 1999 dollars using the Australian consumer price 
index. To capture differences between the auction firms, the variable CHRISTIE'S was used. It equals 
one if the book was offered by Christie's and zero if it was offered by ~0theb~'s.l~  Finally, the 
variable PASSED-IN  was  used  to  capture whether the breadth  of  the estimate ranges  was 
different  for  passed-in  items  compared  with  those  that  sold,  controlling for all  the  other 
variables. PASSED-IN equals one if the book was passed-in, and zero otherwise. 
When Equation  1 was  estimated, the  auction house  dummy CHEtISTIE'S  was  found to  be 
highly significant. Additional regressions were therefore estimated for each of  the two auction 
firms (2A and 3A). The coefficient on PASSED-IN was also significant, and regressions were 
estimated for books  that  sold  (4A)  and  books  that  passed-in  (5A). The  coefficient on  the 
variable DEFECT was not significant in any of  the regressions at the 10 per cent level (this is 
consistent with the statistical and graphical analysis above). The five regressions were therefore 
re-estimated with DEFECT excluded.14 
Table  1.2  gives  the  results  for  the  five  regressions. The  figures in  brackets  are  t  values. 
Significance at the 5 per cent level is indicated by two asterisks; significance at the 10 per cent 
level is indicated by one asterisk. 
13 Bauwens and Ginsburgh (2000) provide evidence that Sotheby's London follows different estimate strategies for 
different asset values - specifically that it underestimates for high value assets and overestimates for low value 
assets, in order to manage the cIientele who attend its auctions. 
14 Tests of the joint significance of the coefficients in each of the regressions were conducted and in every case the 
null hypothesis of  insignificance was  rejected. There is no  reason a priori why  heteroskedasticity should be a 
problem in these regressions, and inspection of the residuals showed no evidence of heteroskedasticity. Table 1.2: Regression results using Equation 1 
The significant and positive coefficient in model 1A ('All')  on CHRISTIE'S indicates breadths 
are on average higher for Christie's auctions, which is consistent with Figure 1.4. 
The coefficient on MIDPOINT was negative in all the regressions, and significant in all except 
model 2A ('Christie's').  Christies and Sotheby's were thus found to differ with respect to the 
relationship  between  estimate  breadth  and  asset  value.  For  Sotheby's,  BREADTH  was 
negatively related to the midpoint of  the estimate range; in other words, estimates were more 
precise for more expensive books. In the case of Christie's, no relationship between BREADTH 
and MIDPOINT was found. 
The  coefficient  on  the  PASSED-IN  dummy  was  significant  and  positive  in  model  lA, 
indicating that estimate range breadths are wider for passed-in items, controlling for the other 
influences.  For the  auction house regressions  (2A and 3A), the coefficients  on  PASSED-IN 
were also positive, though not significant at Sotheby's (the coefficient was significant at the 10 
per cent level at Christie's).  These results are not consistent with the reserve hypothesis. For 
Sotheby's they imply there is no relationship between estimate range breadth and whether an 
item is passed-in. For Christie's (and for the dataset as a whole) the results imply that estimate 
range breadths are wider for passed-in items. What  do  the  regressions  say  about  the  information  hypothesis?  The  coefficients  on  the 
information measures MULTIPLE, SEQUENCE and FERGUSON all had the expected signs 
(they were  all  negative) with  the  exception of  the  coefficient on  SEQUENCE in  model 3A 
('Sotheby's').  The influence of  WTIPLE  was  significant at the 5 per cent level in all the 
models except 3A ('Sotheby's').  The influence of SEQUENCE was significant at least at the 10 
per cent level in all the models except 3A ('Sotheby's')  and 4A ('All  sold'). The influence of 
mERGUSON  was  significant at  the  5 per  cent level  in  all  the  regressions,  except  for  5A 
b 
('Passed-in  only') where it was significant at the 10 per cent level. (Recall that the coefficient 
on DEFECT was not significant in any of the regressions, so DEFECT was excluded.) 
These results are broadly consistent with the graphical and statistical analysis: asset value was 
found to play a role; DEFECT has no effect; SEQUENCE has a small effect; and the other 
information  measures have  a relatively strong effect. Overall, they  provide  support for the 
information hypothesis, because they indicate that estimate range breadths are narrower when 
there is more information  available about  asset values. As  noted  above, the results  do not 
provide  any  support for  the  reserve  hypothesis. The  next  Section investigates  the  reserve 
hypothesis more extensively. 
1.6  PASSED-IN ITEMS AND THIS BREADTH OF ESTImATE RANGES 
The previous Section found some empirical support for the information hypothesis. The subject 
of  this  Section  is the  reserve hypothesis. The  Section begins  with  an  investigation  of  the 
relationship between reserve prices and price estimates, and specifically of whether books sell 
at prices below the low estimate, and how much below. The Section then presents the results of 
a Probit analysis that was used to explore whether the breadth of  estimate ranges is related to 
the probability of an item being passed-in. 
18 The reserves in the auctions studied were secret, but it is possible to make inferences about the 
reserves using information  about whether books sold, the price  at  which  they  sold, and the 
estimate ranges. If  a book sold at  a price below the lower bound of  the estimate range, for 
example, it can be inferred that the reserve price was lower than the lower bound. 
Table  1.3 shows the  proportion  of  prices that  were  below the  low  estimate, the proportion 
between  the  low  and  high  estimates,  and  the  proportion  above  the  high  estimate.  The 
proportions below 80 per cent of  the low estimate and below 50 per cent of the low estimate are 
also shown. 
Table 1.3: Relationship between prices and estimates 
The table shows that it is not unusual for books to sell below the low estimate; a third of all the 
books in the sample did so. It is also not unusual for books to sell below 80 per cent of  the low 
estimate; 15.3 per cent of books did so. Thus a substantial number of books broke the loose rule 
identified by Ekelund et al. (1998) for Latin American art auctions in New York, indicating that 
no such rule applies in Australian rare book auctions. 
The table gives the proportions for Christie's  and  Sotheby's  separately. The data show that 
Sotheby's tended to underestimate prices (a relatively high share sold above the high estimate) 
and that Christie's  was more accurate (insofar as a higher share of  prices fell in the estimate 
range) but was more likely to overestimate than to underestimate prices. To  analyse  the  relationship  between  reserves  and  estimate  breadths  more  formally,  the 
remainder  of  this  Section  presents  the  results  of  a  Probit  analysis.  The  approach  follows 
Ekelund  et  al.  (1998). A  binomial  Probit  model  was  estimated  using  maximum  likelihood 
estimation. The dependent variable took a value of  1 if the lot passed-in, and zero otherwise. 
The explanatory variables captured the  influence of  estimate range breadth,  asset  value  and 
auction house. 
Prob (PASSED-IN) = f(constant, BREADTH, MIDPOINT, CHRISTIE'S) 
(Equation 2) 
The variables are the same as those defined in Section 1.5. The model was estimated in three 
versions: one for the whole sample, one for Christie's only and one for Sotheby's  only. The 
coefficient on the dummy variable MIDPOINT was not significant at the 10 per cent level in all 
three versions and so was excluded. The models were re-estimated. The results are in Table 1.4. 
Significance at the 5 per cent level is indicated by two asterisks; significance at the 10 per cent 
level is indicated by one asterisk. 
Table 1.4: Z statistics from maximum likelihood estimation of Equation 2 
For 1B ('All') and 2B ('Christie's'),  breadth was significantly positively related (at the 5 per 
cent level of  significance) to the probability of  an item being passed-in. For 3B ('Sotheby's') 
the relationship was found to be significant at the 10 per cent level. In 18  ('All'), the influence 
of the dummy variable CHRISTIE'S was highly significant and indicated that the probability of 
an item passing-in was higher at Sotheby's than at Christie's. The finding, that  higher estimate range breadths are associated with  a higher probability of 
items passing-in, is not consistent with the reserve hypothesis; in fact, it is the opposite of the 
relationship that was identified by Ekelund et al. (1998). 
How robust is this result? To explore this question, the remainder of this Section considers how 
the degree of  information available to auction market participants, along with the breadth of the 
estimate range, is related to the likelihood of  an item being passed-in. Underlying this is the 
possibility that the availability of more information influences how sellers set the reserve price. 
The approach adopted to test this was to include in the binomial Probit model the information 
measures described in Section 1.5. The expanded model is as follows: 
Pr(PASSED-IN)  =  f(constant,  BREADTH,  MIDPOINT,  CHRISTIE'S,  MULTIPLE, 
SEQUENCE, DEFECT, FERGUSON)  (Equation 3) 
The variable definitions are the same as those for the previous two models. As before, three 
versions of Equation 3 were estimated: one for the whole sample (lC), one for Christie's only 
(2C) and one for Sotheby's only (3C). The results are in Table 1.5. Again, significance at the 5 
per cent level is indicated by two asterisks, and significance at the 10 per cent level is indicated 
by one asterisk. 
Table 1.5: Z statistics from maximum likelihood estimation of Equation 3 
In model 1C ('All'), the influence of  the auction house dummy was found to be significant and negative, again indicating books at Christie's were less likely to pass-in. 
In  2C  and  3C, the most  important result for this paper  is that the influence of  BREADTH 
becomes insignificant when the information measures are included. The effect is still positive 
but is not significant at the 10  per cent level. 
As in Section 1.5, Christie's and Sotheby's were found to differ with respect to the influence of 
SEQUENCE. For Christie's, there was a significant negative effect for books that were part of 
# 
sequences; for Sotheby's, there was a significant positive  sequence effect. The two auction 
houses appear to follow quite different strategies with respect to how to set estimate ranges and 
reserves for books sold in sequences. It appears that Sotheby's and its seller clients tend to set 
higher reserves for books in sequences. 
Table  1.5  shows that  the  two  auction  houses  also  differ with  respect  to  the  influence of 
MULTIPLE, MIDPOINT and DEFECT. Only FERGUSON, BREADm and the constant term 
had similar influences at the two auction houses on the probability of  items being passed-in. 
Books  in  Ferguson  were  found  to  be  much  less  likely  to  pass-in  than  other  books.  For 
Christie's,  all the information measures have consistent signs; more information reduces the 
likelihood of a book being passed-in (only MULTIPLE is not significant at 10 per cent). In the 
Sotheby's estimation, FERCUSON and hKlLTLPLE have negative signs, consistent with the 
results for Christie's. But the DEFECT variable for Sotheby's also has a negative sign, although 
it is insignificant. 
1.7  CONCLUSION 
This paper  investigated  two  explanations  of  the  breadth  of  ranges  of  expert  estimates  in 
auctions.  Statistical  and  regression  techniques  were  used  to  see  if  estimate  ranges  were narrower in the presence of more information about asset values. A Probit analysis was used to 
see if the breadth of  estimate ranges was associated with the probability of  assets being passed- 
in. 
The  analysis found evidence in  support  of  the  information hypothesis: that estimate range 
breadths are narrower when there is more information about likely prices. The analysis found 
no evidence in support of  the reserve hypothesis: that narrower estimate ranges predict items 
being passed-in. The relationship identified by Ekelund et al. (1998) between the low estimate 
and the reserve price is not relevant to rare book auctions in Australia. 
The paper identified some differences between Christie's and Sotheby's with respect to the 
strategies they adopt in rare book auctions in Australia, This is consistent with the evidence 
from sequential auction studies that the two firms adopt different approaches even though the 
auctions they conduct are broadly similar, Differences in auctioneers' strategies in this setting 
warrant further research. REFERENCES 
Ashenfelter,  0.  (1989)  'How  auctions  work  for  wine  and  art',  Journal  of  Economic 
Perspectives, 3,  pp. 23-36. 
Bauwens,  L.  and  V.  Ginsburgh  (2000)  'Art  experts and  auctions:  Are  pre-sale  estimates 
unbiased and fully informative?' Louvain Economic Record, 66(2), pp. 13  1-44.  A, 
Beggs, Alan and Kathryn Graddy (1997) 'Declining values and the afternoon effect: evidence  s 
from art auctions', Rand Journal of Economics, 28, pp. 544-65. 
Black, J. and D. de Meza (1992) 'Systematic price differences between successive auctions are 
no anomaly', Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, I,  pp. 607-628. 
Chanel, O., L.-A.  Gerard-Varet and S.  Vincent (1996) 'Auction theory and practice: evidence 
from the market for jewellery,'  In: V, Ginsburgh and P. Menger (eds) Economics of  the Arts: 
Selected Essays, Elsevier Science. 
Cutler, D., J. Poterba and L. Summers (1991)  'Speculative dynamics',  Review  of  Economic 
Studies, 58:3, pp. 529-46. 
Ekelund, Robert A. Jr, Rand W. Ressler and John Keith Watson (1998) 'Estimates, bias and no 
sales in Latin-American  art auctions, 1977-1996',  Journal  of  Cultural Economics, 22, pp.  33- 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans,  R.  (1994)  'Sequential  auctions of  stochastically  equivalent  objects', 
b 
Economics Letters, 44, pp. 87-90, 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans,  R, and C.  Kahn (1999) 'Calibration of  a model of  declining prices in 
cattle auctions', Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 39(1), pp. 113-128. Hendricks,  K.  and H.  J.  Paarsch  (1995)  'A  survey  of  recent  empirical  work  concerning 
auctions', Canadian Journal of  Economics, 2,28, pp. 403-26. 
Jones, C., F.  Menezes  and F.  Vella  (1996)  'Auction  price  anomalies:  evidence  from  wool 
auctions in Australia', Australian National University Economics Working Paper no. 303. 
Kagel, J. H.  (1995)  'Auctions: A survey of  experimental research',  in J. H. Kagel and A. E. 
Roth (eds), The Handbook of  Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 
pp. 501-86. 
Kells, S. (2001) 'Price paths in sequential auctions: preliminary evidence from Australian rare 
book auctions,' University of  Melbourne Department of Economics Research Paper no.  820, 
November 2001. 
Kells, S. (2002) The  Australian Book Auction Records,'  University of Melbourne Department 
of Economics Research Paper no. 830, January 2002. 
Klemperer, P. D. (1999)  'Auction  theory:  A  guide to the  literature',  Journal of  Economic 
Surveys, 13,3,  pp. 227-86. 
Laffont, J. (1997) 'Game theory and empirical economics: The case of  auction data', European 
Economic Review, 41, pp. 1-35. 
Louargand, M. A. and J. R. McDaniel (1991) 'Price and efficiency in the art market', Journal 
of  Cultural Economics, 15, pp. 53-65. 
Lusht, K. (1994) 'Order and price in a sequential auction', Journal of  Real Estate Finance and 
Economics, 8, pp. 259-266. 
McAfee, R. Preston and D. Vincent (1993) 'The declining price anomaly', Journal of  Economic 
Theory, 60, pp. 191-212. Menezes,  F.  and  P.  Montiero  (1999)  'Synergies  and  price  trends  in  sequential  auctions', 
Australian National University Economics Working paper no. 366. 
Milgrom,  P.  and  R.  Weber  (1982)  'A  theory  of  auctions  and  competitive  bidding', 
Econometrics, 50, 5, pp. 1089-1  122. 
Pesando, J.  and P.  Shum (1996) 'Price anomalies at auction: evidence from  the market for  ,. 
modem prints', in V. Ginsburgh and P.  Menger (eds)  Economics of  the Arts: Selected Essays, 
a 
Elsevier Science, pp. 113-134. 
Weber, R. J. (1983) 'Multi-Object Auctions', in R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, M. Shubik and R. M. 
Stark (eds) Auctions, Bidding, and Contracting: Uses and Theory, New York University Press, 
New York, pp. 165-194. NO.  AUTI IOR/S  TITIX  DATE 
868 Olan T. Henry, 
Nilss Olekalns & 
Jonathan Thong 
869 Olan T. Henry & 
Michael McKenzie 
870  Kalvinder Shields, 
Nilss Olekalns, 
Olan T. Henry & 
Chris Brooks 
871 Matthew Amor & 
William Griffiths 
872 William E. Griffiths & 
Christopher 
J. ODonneIl 
873 Stuart Kells 
Do Stock Market Returns Predict Changes to Output?  January 2003 
Evidence from a Nonlinear Panel Data Model 
The Impact of Short Selling on the Price-Volume  January 2003 
Relationship: Evidence from Hong Kong 
Measuring the Response of Macroeconomic Uncertainty  February 2003 
to Shocks 
Modelling the Behaviour and Performance of Australian  February 2003 
Football Tipsters 
Estimating Variable Returns to Scale Production Frontiers  February 2003 
with Alternative Stochastic Assumptions 
Explaining the Breadth of Expert Estimate Ranges in  February 2003 
Auctions of Rare Books 
INTERNA'T.  ISBN NO.  TOTAL 
WORKING  NO. OF 
PAPER NO.  PAGES 
IWP 785  0734025238  25 
IWP 786  0734025246  48 
IWP 787  0734025254  20 
IWP 788  0734025262  23 
IWP 789  0 7340 2527 0  35 
IWP 790  0 7340 2528 9  26 